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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN OKLAHOMA
ANTITRUST LAW
D. KENT MEYERS* & JENNIFER A. DUTrON**
This Article covers six antitrust topics of interest addressed by Oklahoma
state and federal courts within the past decade. Part I discusses the doctrine
of a single actor, which is one of the distinctions between federal and
Oklahoma antitrust law. Part II addresses state action immunity and the
uncertainty regarding antitrust liability in Oklahoma. Next, Part III focuses
on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission and
the consequential preclusion of state antitrust claims. Part IV provides the
latest ruling on per se analysis in below-cost pricing. Part V confirms the
requirement of proof of market power under a rule of reason standard.
Finally, Part VI gives guidance on how to define a relevant market and
submarket under Oklahoma antitrust law.
I. Doctrineof Single Actor
Although the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act' (Act) is "similar to federal
antitrust legislation,"2 it is not identical. Unlike its federal counterpart,
Section 1 of the Sherman Act,3 Section 203(A) of the Act provides that

* Director, Crowe & Dunlevy, a Professional Corporation, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
B.A., University of Oklahoma, 1960; J.D., University of Oklahoma, 1964; LL.M., Harvard Law
School, 1976. Adjunct Professor (Antitrust), Oklahoma City University School of Law,
University of Oklahoma College of Law, and University of Tulsa Law School.
** Associate, Crowe & Dunlevy, a Professional Corporation, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
B.A., Oklahoma City University, 2000; J.D., Oklahoma City University, 2003.
1. See 79 OKLA. STAT. §§ 201-212 (2001).
2. Oakridge Invs., Inc. v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 1986 OK CIV APP 8, 8,719 P.2d 848,
850.
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
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unilateral anticompetitive conduct by a defendant is actionable as an
unreasonable restraint of trade.4
This key distinction was first recognized in 1996 by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Harolds Stores, Inc. v. DillardDepartment
Stores, Inc.5 In Harolds, the court noted that while Section 1 of the Sherman
Act prohibits only concerted action between two or more entities,6 the Act
specifically prohibits "'[e]very act ...

in restraint of trade."' 7 The Tenth

Circuit held that "[b]ecause the Oklahoma antitrust legislation differs from the
relevant federal statute on this key point, federal authority... does not govern
this particular issue of Oklahoma statutory law." 8 Recently, the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma and the Tenth Circuit in Green
Country Food Market, Inc. v. Bottling Group, LLC,9 as well as the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma in Opitz, Inc. v. Tri-State
Chemicals, Inc.,"° affirmed this important distinction.
II. Doctrine of State Action Immunity
Both Oklahoma state and federal courts have issued decisions within the
last few years regarding the applicability of the federal doctrine of state action
immunity within antitrust law in Oklahoma. Although these decisions have
redefined and redirected Oklahoma antitrust law, they have also created
uncertainty.
Fine Airport Parking, Inc. v. City of Tulsa" presents a novel and
unprecedented holding - "that municipalities are not immune from the
Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act under the federal doctrine of state action
immunity."' 2 In this case, the plaintiff, Fine, operated an off-airport parking
service and competed with the defendant, Tulsa Airport Authority (Tulsa),

4.
5.
6.
7.

See 79 OKLA. STAT. § 203(A).
82 F.3d 1533 (10th Cir. 1996).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (prohibiting "every contract, combination.., or conspiracy").
Harolds, 82 F.3d at 1549-50 (quoting 79 OKLA. STAT. § 203(A)).

8. Id. at 1550. The Tenth Circuit also held that the difference between the Sherman Act
and the Act prevented federal courts' decisions from providing "valuable assistance in
interpreting the provisions of the Oklahoma [antitrust] statutes." Id. (quoting Teleco, Inc. v.
Ford Indus., Inc., 1978 OK 159, 13, 587 P.2d 1360, 1362).
9. 371 F.3d 1275, 1278 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that section 203(A) of the Act "prohibits
unilateral acts in restraint of trade").
10. CIV-96-0174, slip op. at 5-7 (W.D. Okla. June 17, 1999) (stating that under Oklahoma
antitrust law unilateral conduct alleged to be an unreasonable restraint of trade is actionable and
subject to per se analysis).
11. 2003OK27,71P.3d5.
12. Id. 20, 71 P.3d at 12.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol57/iss4/2
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which operated an on-airport parking service.13 Fine filed suit alleging that
Tulsa's operations constituted exclusionary practices that violated Oklahoma
antitrust statutes.' 4 Tulsa then filed a motion to dismiss Fine's petition,
arguing that Tulsa's operation of the airport parking facility was specifically
authorized by state statute 5 and, therefore, immune. 6 The trial court granted
the motion, holding that the Act incorporated the federal doctrine of state
action immunity, also known as the Parker doctrine,17 and that Tulsa's
conduct was therefore immune from antitrust liability." The Oklahoma Court
of Civil Appeals affirmed, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted
certiorari review.' 9
On review, Tulsa argued that the Oklahoma legislature intended the federal
doctrine of state action immunity to apply to a municipality acting pursuant
to state law because the legislature required the courts to interpret the Act
according to federal antitrust law.2 ° The Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed,
however, holding that municipalities are not immune from the Act by virtue
of the Parkerdoctrine. 2' The court based its decision on the fact that the Act
clearly expressed the legislature's intent for the Act to apply to municipalities
because it specifically defined a "person" covered by the statute to include a
"municipal corporation. 2 2
The court also held that federal antitrust law did not intend for such an
immunity to apply because the principles of federalism, which formed the
foundation of the federal state action immunity doctrine, were meaningless
when determining municipal liability under state antitrust laws. 3 In so
holding, the court elaborated on why the federalism principles, which were
intended to protect the relationship between the sovereign federal and
sovereign state governments, did not apply to Tulsa's situation:
The Parkerdecision rested on general principles of federalism
involving the relationship of the federal government to the
sovereign states, and on the specific constitutional limits on federal

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. [2, 71 P.3d at 8.
Id. 3, 71P.3d at 8.
See Municipal Airports Act, 3 OKLA. STAT. §§ 65.1-65.22 (2001).
Fine 3,71 P.3dat8.
For further information, see Parkerv. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), and its progeny.
Fine14,71 P.3dat8.
Id. 5, 71 P.3d at 8.
Id. 15, 71 P.3d at 10.
Id. 20, 29, 71 P.3d at 12, 14.
Id. [ 14, 20, 71 P.3d at 10, 14.
Id. 18, 71 P.3d at 11.
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power contained in the tenth and eleventh amendments. These
principles are not present in this case. The relationship between
the federal government and the states is not parallel to the
relationship between the state government and the cities. Cities are
creatures of the state, derive their power from it, and are not
recognized as independent sovereigns. The concern in Parkerand
recent United States Supreme Court cases applying it has to do
with potential conflicts between the laws of two different
sovereigns - federal and state governments.
By contrast, the present case involves a conflict between the
state laws dealing with municipalities and the state antitrust law.
The rationale behind the Parkerexemption is not applicable to this
type of case .... ."
The court ultimately held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Fine's
petition. Although Tulsa was not immune from antitrust liability under the
Parkerdoctrine, the court held that Tulsa was not subject to the Act because
its operations were authorized by the Municipal Airports Act.25
Other important cases regarding state action immunity are Telecor
Communications, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.2 6 and Pittsburg
County Rural Water DistrictNo. 7 v. City ofMcAlester" In Telecor, Telecor
filed suit alleging that Southwestern Bell engaged in monopolistic behavior
in violation of both federal and state antitrust laws.28 Based in part on
evidence of Southwestern Bell's lobbying of the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission (OCC) and its conduct before November 1996, when its legal
monopolization ended as a result of OCC rulemaking, the jury found
Southwestern Bell guilty of monopolistic behavior in violation of Oklahoma
antitrust law.29 Southwestern Bell thereafter filed a motion for judgment as
a matter of law or for a new trial, arguing that the verdict violated the federal
state action doctrine because the doctrine barred the use of such conduct to
prove an antitrust violation. 30 The U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Oklahoma held that the federal state action doctrine only applies to federal

24. Id. 19, 71 P.3d at 11-12 (quoting Town of Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 314
N.W.2d 321, 324 (Wis. 1982) (internal citations and alterations omitted)).
25. See id. [ 24-29, 71 P.3d at 13-14.
26. 305 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2002).
27. 358 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 2004).
28. Telecor, 305 F.3d at 1128-29.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1130, 1139.
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antitrust claims, not state antitrust claims.3 ' Because Southwestern Bell was
only found to have violated Oklahoma law, its argument failed.32 On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit "decline[d] to address whether the state action doctrine
applies to state antitrust claims."3 3
In PittsburgCounty Rural WaterDistrict,the City of McAlester competed
with a rural county water association, Pittsburg County, in providing water to
rural residents, allegedly in violation of both federal and state antitrust laws.34
Contrary to the Western District's holding in Telecor, the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Oklahoma implicitly held that the federal state
action doctrine applies to both federal and state antitrust claims when it
dismissed Pittsburg County's antitrust claims upon a finding that McAlester' s
conduct fell within the Parker doctrine.35 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal on other grounds,36 and once again
declined to address whether the state action doctrine applies to state antitrust
claims.3 7
IlI. Exclusive Jurisdictionof the Oklahoma CorporationCommission
Two federal decisions issued within the past few years address the
preclusion of state antitrust claims because of the exclusive jurisdiction of the
OCC. In Trigen-Oklahoma City Energy Corp. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric
Co.,38 Trigen and OG&E competed indirectly for cooling equipment

31. Id. at 1139.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Pittsburg County Rural Water Dist. No. 7 v. City of McAlester, 358 F.3d 694, 700 (10th
Cir. 2004).
35. Id. at 721; see alsoPittsburg County Rural Water Dist. No. 7 v. City of McAlester, No.
97-185-P, 2002 WL 32297921, at *5 (E.D. Okla. June 7, 2002).
36. The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment based on the
essential facilities doctrine. Under this doctrine, a business or a group of businesses that control
a "scarce facility" must grant competitors reasonable access to the facility. See Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1519 (10th Cir. 1984); see also WILLIAM C.
HOLMES, ANTIrRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 3:11 (2004 ed. 2003) (stating that the doctrine holds
that "it can be an act of actual or attempted monopolization for a monopolist (or near
monopolist, in attempt situations) to unreasonably deny competitors access to an essential
facility or resource that it controls, where it does so for the purpose of further entrenching or
acquiring a monopoly position"). Here, the court found that the defendant was not a
"monopolist" under the doctrine, and therefore, could not be held liable. Pittsburg County
Rural Water Dist., 358 F.3d at 721-22. For more on Pittsburg County Rural Water District's
application of, and recent developments in, the essential facilities doctrine, see infra note 68.
37. Pittsburg County Rural Water Dist., 358 F.3d at 721.
38. 244 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2001).
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customers in Oklahoma City. 39 Trigen sued OG&E, alleging that its actions
constituted monopolization and attempted monopolization in violation of
federal antitrust law and an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of state
antitrust law.4 ° The jury returned a verdict in favor of Trigen on all claims
except its attempted monopolization claim." On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
reversed the judgment and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the
complaint based in part42 upon its holding that the state antitrust claim was a
"collateral attack[] on OG&E's filed rates,"4 3 and therefore "within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the OCC.""
One year later in Telecor, Southwestern Bell cited Trigen in support of its
argument that Telecor's claims were likewise precluded because of the
exclusive jurisdiction of the OCC.45 The Tenth Circuit readily distinguished
and limited its Trigen holding. The court held that exclusive jurisdiction of
the OCC was inapplicable because Telecor, unlike Trigen, complained about
Southwestern Bell's unilateral conduct, not an OCC order or Southwestern
Bell's conduct ordered by the OCC. 6 Moreover, the court found that
Southwestern Bell "fail[ed] to offer any basis for concluding that such an
appeal from agency inaction was available."4 7
IV. Per Se Analysis in Below-Cost Pricing
Recently, in CrestFoods of Edmond, L.L.C. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 8 the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma held that under the
Act, courts should not apply a per se analysis to below-cost pricing that
violates the Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act.4 9
Under Oklahoma antitrust law, a per se analysis is appropriate when
restraints of trade, "because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack

39. Id. at 1223.
40. Id. at 1223-24.
41. Id.
42. The court dismissed the federal antitrust claims based on the state action immunity
doctrine. See id. at 1225-27.
43. Trigen's state antitrust claim was a collateral attack on the OCC because "the heart of
Trigen's complaint [was] that OG&E's rates [were] too low and that Trigen either had to lower
its own rates in response or lose business." Id. at 1229.
44. Id. at 1225, 1229.
45. Telecor Communications, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 1140
(10th Cir. 2002).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. CIV-00-1659 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 26, 2003).
49. Id. at 9.
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of any redeeming value, are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and,
therefore, are deemed per se violations of the antitrust laws without proof of
the challenged conduct's effect on competition."50 Under the Oklahoma
Unfair Sales Act, evidence of below-cost pricing constitutes "prima facie
evidence" of "intent to injure competitors and the result of a substantial
lessening of competition."'" Using these two principles, Crest argued that
because below-cost pricing violates the Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act and
because such conduct gives rise to presumptions of an intent to injure a
competitor and results in a substantial lessening of competition, below-cost
pricing is, as a matter of law, "a sufficient predicate for applying a per se
analysis to determine whether that below-cost pricing violates Oklahoma's
Antitrust Act as an illegal restraint of trade." 2
The district court refused to accept Crest's argument and held that the
prima facie presumptions created under the Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act are to
be applied narrowly and only to the Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act.5 3 The court
determined that while the presumptions were effective for purposes of the
Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act, which is "essentially protectionist legislation,"
they were not effective for purposes of the Act, which is "pro-competitive
legislation."5 4 The court concluded that Crest's attempts to satisfy the per se
requirements of antitrust law with an Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act provision
regarding prima facie evidence of violating that act "stretch[ed] the bootstrap
too far."55

50. Id. at 8 (citing Beville v. Curry, 2001 OK 1, 12,39 P.3d 754, 759). While Oklahoma
antitrust law recognizes the existence of a per se violation, courts are more likely to adopt a rule
of reason analysis in determining if an unreasonable restraint of trade exists. See Opitz, Inc. v.
Tri-State Chems. Inc., CIV-96-0174, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 4, 1998) (noting that "the
Oklahoma Supreme Court... has not yet found [a per se] violation in a reported decision, but
has held that the area of per se violations must be 'carefully limited"') (quoting Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of Okla. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1977 OK 17, 15,561 P.2d 499, 506); see
also Beville 12, 39 P.3d at 759 (stating that "[o]ur analysis must proceed under the rule of
reason").
51. Crest, CIV-00-1659, slip op. at 10; see also Diehl v. Magic Empire Grocers Ass'n,
1964 OK 234, 399 P.2d 460; 15 OKLA. STAT. § 598.5(c) (2001).
52. Crest, CIV-00-1659, slip op. at 8-9.
53. Id. at 11; see also id. at 10 (holding that "Diehl applies only where the issue is whether
unrebutted evidence supports a prima facie violation of the [Oklahoma] Unfair Sales Act").
54. Id.
55. Id. Of note, however, is Harolds Stores, Inc. v. DillardDepartment Stores, Inc., 82
F.3d 1533, 1548-49 (10th Cir. 1996), a case in which the court allowed the plaintiff, under a
rule of reason analysis, to "stretch the bootstrap" in almost the exact same way that the court
prohibits here. In Harolds,the court permitted, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, the plaintiff's
expert's testimony that by "selling garments below cost in violation of the Oklahoma Unfair
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V. Requirementfor Proofof Market Power
In Beville v. Curry,56 the Oklahoma Supreme Court expressly adopted the
principles espoused in federal case law regarding market power as a
prerequisite to antitrust liability under a rule of reason standard. In this case,
Beville, a radiologist, filed suit against numerous health care providers, their
trustees, and an administrator, alleging various violations of the Act.57 The
defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which the trial court
granted. 8 Even though the trial court did not specify its reasons for granting
summary judgment, it was apparent from the record that "the defendants' lack
of market power was deemed to be the controlling issue in the case. 59 The
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed based on the defendants' lack of
the requisite market power.6"
The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari and also affirmed the trial
court's summary judgment grant because Beville "failed to refute the
defendants' prima facie showing of lack of market power."'" As a foundation
for its decision, the court recognized many essential principles of federal
antitrust law:
(a) The essential element of an antitrust claim is injury to competition. To
prove this, the plaintiff may show "either 1) the potential for genuine adverse
affect on competition by possession of sufficient market power in the relevant
market, or 2) evidence of actual detrimental effects on competition";
(b) To prove the potential for genuine adverse affect on competition, the
plaintiff must "define the relevant market and establish that the defendant
possessed market power"; and,
(c) "Market power is the preliminary threshold inquiry and is often
dispositive of antitrust cases. 62
Moreover, the court discussed Levine v. CentralFloridaMedicalAffiliates,
Inc.,63 a federal case in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit held that "even if [the plaintiff] had adequately defined the relevant

Sales Act, [defendant] not only injured [plaintiff], but harmed competition in general." Id. at
1548-49.
56. 2001 OK 1, 39 P.3d 754.
57. Id. 11, 39 P.3d at 756.
58. Id. 5, 39 P.3d at 757.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. 1 1, 39 P.3d at 756.
62. Id. 1 13, 39 P.3d at 759-60 (internal citations omitted).
63. 72 F.3d 1538 (1lth Cir. 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol57/iss4/2
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market ... 'absent evidence that the defendants had sufficient market power
to affect competition,"' the plaintiffs unreasonable restraint of trade claims
must fail.'
After establishing the necessity of defining the market and proving
defendants' market power, the court assessed the evidence concerning the
defendants' market power and held it to be insufficient to invoke antitrust
liability.65 In so doing, the court recognized many federal antitrust cases
applying the rule of reason that refused to hold defendants with minimal
market power - ranging between 25% and 50.1% - liable.66 In response to
one of Beville's arguments, the court expressly adopted the federal principle
that a plaintiff must prove the defendant's market power to prevail on an
67
attempt to monopolize claim.
VI. Relevant ProductMarket (Submarket) Defined
Most recently, in Green CountryFoodMarket, Inc. v. Bottling Group,LLC,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit extensively addressed how to
define a relevant market under the Act. In Green Country, the plaintiffs, a
group of retail grocery stores owned by two individuals and operated in Tulsa,
filed suit under the Act against the only local distributor of Pepsi and Pepsiaffiliated products and its holding company. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants monopolized, attempted to monopolize, conspired to monopolize,
and denied access to an essential facility68 after discontinuing its sales to the

64. Beville 13, 39 P.3d at 760 (citing Levine, 72 F.3d at 1553).
65. See id. [ 14-18, 39 P.3d at 760-61.
66. Id. 18, 39 P.3d at 761.
67. Id. 1 24, 39 P.3d at 763 (citing Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447
(1993)). The court also addressed the use and application of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI), which is used to measure market concentration in determining probable market power.
See also SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994).
68. The essential facilities doctrine is another example of the differences that exist between
federal antitrust laws and Oklahoma antitrust laws. Under the Act, an "essential facility" is
defined as a facility:
a. which is controlled by an entity that possesses monopoly power,
b. that a competitor would be unable to practically or reasonably duplicate,
c. the use of which has been unreasonably denied to a competitor or a
customer of the entity that possesses monopoly power, and
d. that it would be feasible to allow the competitor or customer to use or have
access to without causing harm to or unreasonably interfering with the entity that
possesses monopoly power.
79 OKLA. STAT. § 203(D)(3) (2001) (emphasis added). As is evident from the statutory text,
Oklahoma's definition specifically includes customers. The Sherman Act, however, does not
cover "a customer" within its essential facility definition. See Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.
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plaintiffs.69 The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove the beverage products
distributed by the defendants constituted a relevant product market.7 ° On
appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in requiring proof of
a relevant product market, and alternatively, challenged the court's definition
of the relevant product market.7 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal.72
In analyzing how to define the relevant product market under the Act, the
appellate court applied federal case law. 73 The court cited federal law for the
fundamental antitrust principle that the relevant market consists of two
elements: the product market and the geographic market.74 The court then
discussed the standard for defining a relevant product market as articulated in75
the federal landmark case of UnitedStates v. E.L du Pontde Nemours & Co.
and its progeny, 76 as well as the standard for determining the existence of
submarkets within a relevant product market as set out in Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States.7 7 The court ultimately held that "the general standard
articulated in du Pont, in conjunction with the specific factors announced in

v. Aspen Skiing Corp., 738 F.2d 1509, 1520 (10th Cir. 1984), affd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985); see
also Pittsburg County Rural Water Dist. No. 7 v. City of McAlester, 358 F.3d 694, 721 (10th
Cir. 2004) (citing the proper federal standard, but in dicta, erroneously applying the federal
standard to the plaintiffs Oklahoma antitrust claim). Consequently, the Oklahoma essential
facilities doctrine is more expansive than the federal doctrine.
69. Green Country Food Mkt., Inc. v. Bottling Group, LLC, 371 F.3d 1275, 1277-78 (10th
Cir. 2004). The defendants discontinued sales to the plaintiffs after two of the plaintiffs sued
one of the defendants' predecessors-in-interest for price discrimination in violation of the
Oklahoma antitrust laws. The defendants' discontinuation resulted in the plaintiffs' lack of
access to Pepsi and Pepsi-affiliated products other than through retail purchases. Id.
70. Id. at 1278.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1277.
73. See id. at 1281-82. The court first noted that the Act was to be construed according to
federal antitrust law and that sections 203(B) and 203(C) of the Act "both require[d] that the
plaintiff prove a relevant market." Id. at 1281.
74. Id. at 1282.
75. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
76. See Green Country, 371 F.3d at 1282.
77. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). Although this is the first time that federal law has been adopted
as the standard for determining the existence of a submarket under Oklahoma antitrust law, it
is not the first time that the concept of submarkets has been recognized under state law. See
Oakridge Invs., Inc. v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 1986 OK CIV APP 8, 1 14,719 P.2d 848, 851;
Teleco, Inc. v. Ford Indus., Inc., 1978 OK 159, 1 11, 587 P.2d 1360, 1363.
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Brown Shoe, provide[] the applicable standard for defining the relevant
product market [under the Act]."78
The Tenth Circuit also adopted federal law in declining to accept the
plaintiffs' argument that the defendants' products alone constituted a relevant
product market.79 The court referenced federal cases when applying the
general rule that "[e]ven where brand loyalty is intense" a manufacturer' s own
product or a single-branded product cannot establish a relevant product
market."0 In dicta, the court recognized the soft drink industry as a
"prototypical example" of an industry in which a manufacturer's own product
or a single-branded product cannot establish a relevant product market.8
The Tenth Circuit further adopted federal law in declining to accept the
plaintiffs' alternative argument that the defendants' full line of products
constituted a cluster market over which the defendants had monopoly power.82
The court relied on federal cases in support of the fundamental antitrust
principles that "[a] 'cluster market' exists where a seller provides a full line
of products or services that create a separate product market consisting of that
'cluster' of products or services" and that "[a] cluster market exists only when
the 'cluster' is itself an object of consumer demand."8 3 Thereafter, the court
held:
[T]he fact that an entity distributes a number of different products
does not of itself give it monopoly power in a "cluster market"; it
merely defines the product(s)/service(s) offered by the distributor

78. Green Country, 371 F.3d at 1282.
79. See id. In support of its argument, the plaintiffs offered evidence that consumers were
"brand loyal" to Pepsi products. The court found that such evidence was "an insufficient basis
for concluding that Pepsi constitute[d] a relevant product market" and that the "[p]laintiffs ha[d]
offered no evidence - other than their own testimony pertaining to brand loyalty - to prove
that Pepsi branded products constitute[d] a market distinct from other soft drink products." Id.
80. See id. at 1282. The court noted, however, that in rare circumstances a manufacturer's
products can constitute a relevant product market. See id. at 1283 (citing Eastman Kodak, Co.
v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481-82 (1992), as an example of such an
instance).
81. See id. at 1283.
82. See id. at 1284. The court noted two key problems with the plaintiffs' argument: the
plaintiffs did not present evidence that the different products distributed by the defendant
together met the definition of a market cluster, and even if a cluster market existed, the plaintiffs
failed to argue that the defendant had monopoly power in that market.
83. Id. at 1283-84.
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as a package and then limits the relevant product market to those
entities that can offer a competitive package.84
VII. Conclusion
Throughout the past decade, Oklahoma antitrust law has evolved and taken
on a life of its own. In some areas, it has continued to adopt and expand
federal antitrust law. In other areas, however, it has declined to follow federal
law, and instead has created and implemented its own principles.

84. See id. at 1284-85.
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